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Abstract 
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s 
voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their 
contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended 
game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a 
laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the 
two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian’s model, where a 
person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players 
tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less 
damaging to public good provision than previously thought.  
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  11. Introduction 
This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, voluntary contributions to a public 
good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors. We focus on 
a simple setting with two players, quasi-linear returns from private/public good consumption and 
complete information about returns from public/private good consumption (Varian, 1994). 
Varian (1994) has shown that commitment opportunities may aggravate the free-rider problem in 
this environment: under appropriate assumptions, players can enjoy a first-mover advantage by 
committing to free-ride, forcing second-movers to provide the public good on their own. When 
players with a high value of the public good move first, commit to free-ride and let players with 
lower valuations provide the public good, a detrimental outcome results: overall provision is 
lower than when players contribute simultaneously. Gächter et al. (2010) present experimental 
evidence consistent with the Varian model prediction: when the player with the higher valuation 
moves first contributions are significantly lower than with alternative move orders. However, 
they also note several departures from the model predictions. In particular, they find that first-
movers who commit to free-ride trigger systematic punishment on the part of second-movers.
1 
Also, while overall provision of the public good is lower when the high value player moves first, 
the high value player typically fails to attain her predicted first-mover advantage. Because there 
is no advantage in committing to be a free-rider, it is unclear whether individuals will actually 
choose to commit if they are given the opportunity to do so, and thus whether the detrimental 
move ordering will emerge in practice. 
Our paper studies endogenous timing following the approach of Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990).
 2 We embed Varian’s (1994) voluntary contributions game into their ‘extended game 
with observable delay’ and ‘extended game with action commitment’; these differ in how 
commitment opportunities are modeled. In Section 2 we describe these games in detail and 
analyze their theoretical properties, both under standard assumptions, i.e. where players 
maximize own material payoffs, and assuming inequality averse preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 
                                                 
1 Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002) also examine Varian’s model and find similar departures from model 
predictions. For the parameters they study, however, aggregate contributions are predicted to be quite similar across 
move orderings, and in fact are quite similar in the experiment.  
2 Other important theoretical contributions to the literature on endogenous timing games include Saloner (1987), 
Robson (1990), Mailath (1993), Ellingsen (1995), van Damme and Hurkens (1999), Matsumura (1999), Normann 
(2002), van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Santos-Pinto (2008). 
  21999). We show that sequential move orderings that result in reduced public good provision 
cannot arise in the extended game with observable delay under either set of assumptions. In the 
extended game with action commitment a detrimental move ordering emerges under the standard 
assumption, and can also emerge if players are inequality averse. Moreover, inequality aversion 
introduces a rich set of theoretical outcomes in both games, depending on the precise preference 
parameters. For example, inequality aversion also introduces the possibility that both players 
delay their contribution in both extended games.   
In Section 3 we describe a laboratory experiment that implements these extended games. 
For both extended games we find that subjects show a strong tendency to avoid making a 
commitment to early contributions. Importantly, less than 20% of the extended games result in 
the detrimental move ordering, and even in the extended game with action commitment where 
the detrimental move ordering is predicted to emerge according to standard theory, this move 
order is observed less than 20% of the time. This tendency to delay decisions until the last period 
may be consistent with inequality aversion. In fact, other patterns in the data are also consistent 
with concerns for earnings equality. For example, as in Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund (2002) 
and Gächter et al. (2010), we find that second-movers are willing to punish first-movers who 
make low contributions and this results in a more even distribution of contributions than 
predicted by standard theory, and reduces the benefits of commitment. However, we find that 
inequality aversion can only partially explain the tendency to delay. In Section 4 we conclude. 
2. Theory 
We begin by summarizing Varian's (1994) model. Player i, i ∈ {HIGH, LOW}, is 
endowed with wealth ei and contributes an amount 0 g        to a public good. The remainder 
is allocated to private good consumption. The total amount of the public good provided is 
  g       g    . Player i’s payoff i g   s  iven by:  
         g            
where individual i’s return from the public good,       , is increasing and strictly concave. Each 
player has an interior ‘stand-alone contribution’ 0 g         where g        g     .
3 We focus on 
the case where these stand-alone contributions are not too different,        g         
                                                 
3 Player i’s stand-alone contribution is the contribution that maximizes her payoff when j contributes zero. In Varian’s 
terminology, HIGH is the ‘player who likes the public good most’ 
  3       g        g      , as this is the case where equilibrium contributions depend on the move 
ordering. 
2.1 Equilibrium under exogenous move orderings 
The players’ best-response functions are given by g    g   m a x         g  ,0 and are 
displayed in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Best-response functions 
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The unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game is at point S, where LOW 
contributes zero and HIGH makes her stand-alone contribution. We denote the resulting 
equilibrium payoffs as     
   and      
  . In a sequential move game where LOW moves first 
HIGH’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy is given by her best-response function 
             , shown as a dotted line in the Figure. LOW’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy 
is her most preferred point on this best response function, which is at S where she contributes 
nothing. Thus the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential game is also at 
point S. In a sequential game where HIGH moves first LOW’s subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategy is given by              . The assumption that stand-alone contributions are not too 
different implies that HIGH’s most preferred point on LOW’s best response function is at H, 
where she contributes nothing and LOW contributes       . Hence the subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome is at point H with resulting payoffs     
    and      
  . Note that      
   
     
   (since HIGH prefers point H to S) and      
        
   (since LOW consumes less of the 
private good and less of the public good at H, compared to S). Also, public good provision (and 
  4the sum of payoffs) is lower at H than S; hence we refer to the sequential game where HIGH 
moves first as the detrimental move ordering.
4 In summary, relative to other move orderings, 
the sequential game where HIGH moves first features a higher payoff for HIGH, a lower 
payoff for LOW, lower public good provision, and lower combined payoffs.  
2.2 Endogenous moves 
We analyze endogenous timing following the approach of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We 
embed Varian’s voluntary contributions game within extended games in which players can choose 
the timing of their contributions, and examine the equilibria of these extended games. 
2.2.1 The extended game with observable delay 
In the extended game with observable delay each person makes one contribution decision but 
there are two contribution periods. At the beginning of the game players simultaneously announce 
in which period they will make their contribution decisions and are committed to their choice of 
contribution period. Players then observe the profile of announcements and make their 
contribution decisions according to the resulting move ordering. Thus, if the players announce the 
same period then they play the simultaneous contribution game described in the previous sub-
section, while if one announces the first period and the other the second period they play the 
relevant sequential contribution game. Note that a player is unable to unilaterally choose a move 
ordering. By committing to contributing in the first period a player ensures that she does not move 
second, but cannot rule out the possibility that players move sequentially. Likewise, by committing 
to contributing in the second period a player ensures that she does not move first in a sequential 
game, but it is still possible that she ends up making simultaneous contributions. Note also that 
when a player commits to a contribution period she does not commit to how mu ontributes.  ch she c
A pure strategy for player i specifies a choice of a contribution period       1,2 , a 
contribution decision if          1 , a contribution decision if          2 , a contribution 
decision if     1   and     2 , and a contribution function mapping the set of possible 
                                                
  5
 
4 The sum of payoffs can be written                              G                    , which is concave 
in G. The sum of payoffs is maximized at G
* where      
′             
′       1 . When total provision is less than 
G
* the sum of marginal returns from the public good exceed unity and combined payoffs increase with G. At point S 
total provision is equal to        , and the sum of marginal returns is      
′                  
′                 
′            
1 1 . Thus, at S total contributions are lower than G
* and combined payoffs increase with G.  contribution decisions of player j, [0,   ], onto the set of possible contribution decisions of player 
i, [0,   ], if     2   and     1 . 
The subgames following the announcement stage are proper subgames with unique 
subgame perfect equilibria, as discussed in the previous sub-section. We analyze the reduced 
game that results when these subgames are replaced by their subgame perfect equilibrium values. 
The payoff matrix for the reduced game is shown below: 
  LOW 
HIGH       1          2    
   1                
  ,     
            
  ,     
   
       2        
  ,     
         
  ,     
   
Recalling that πHIGH
H  > πHIGH
S  and πLOW
H  <  πLOW
S , the reduced game has multiple equilibria. 
In all of them LOW chooses       1 , while HIGH chooses        1  with any probability p ∈ 
[0, 1]. Thus in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game the detrimental move 
ordering cannot arise.  
As an equilibrium refinement Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) select equilibria that do not 
involve the use of a weakly dominated strategy in the reduced game. This refinement gives a 
sharp prediction in our game. For HIGH, announcing period 1 weakly dominates any strategy 
placing positive probability on announcing period 2. This refinement thus selects the equilibrium 
in which both players announce to contribute in period 1.  
2.2.2 The extended game with action commitment 
In the extended game with action commitment players can contribute in exactly one of 
two periods (period 1 or 2). In period 1 each player simultaneously chooses either a contribution 
or to wait (W). If player i chooses to wait in period 1, she must then make a contribution decision 
  ∈  0,    in period 2, after being informed of player j’s action (either    or W) in period 1. If 
neither player waits no decisions are made in the second period and the game ends. If both wait 
then the players play the simultaneous contribution game in the second period. If one contributes 
in the first period and the other waits the player that waits observes the other player’s 
  6contribution before making a contribution decision in the second period. As in the game with 
observable delay, the actual move ordering depends on the profile of decisions. However, unlike 
in the game with observable delay, when a player makes an early contribution decision she does 
not know whether the other player is also making an early decision or is wait g.  in  
A pure strategy for player i, specifies a choice in the first period, either   ∈  0,    or W, a 
contribution in the second period if both players wait in period 1, and a contribution function 
mapping player j’s possible contribution decisions, [0,   ], onto her own possible contribution 
decisions, [0,   ], if i chose to wait in period 1 and j chose to contribute in period 1. 
Again, this game has proper subgames with unique subgame perfect equilibria at the 
beginning of period 2 and we analyze the reduced game that results when these subgames are 
replaced by their subgame perfect equilibrium values. Formally, in the reduced game player i 
chooses a strate       gy   ∈ [0,   ]   {W}. Player’s i payoff function is given by:  





       ,                                               ∈  0,               ∈  0,                    
      ,                                          ∈  0,                                              
           ,                                                ∈  0,                                   
  
                                                                                                                          
 
where          denotes player i’s best-response function.   
In the reduced game there are three pure strategy equilibria. First,       0  and        
        is an equilibrium, corresponding to the simultaneous move equilibrium. Second,       0  
and           is an equilibrium, corresponding to the sequential move equilibrium where LOW 
moves first. Third, and finally, there is an equilibrium in which        0  and         , 
corresponding to the equilibrium with the detrimental move ordering.
5 Thus the extended game 
has three pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, reproducing the outcomes of the three 
exogenous move ordering games.
6 Note that the detrimental move ordering may arise in a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game with action commitment. 
Again, if we restrict attention to equilibria that do not involve the use of a weakly 
dominated strategy in the reduced game we obtain a sharper prediction. The first two equilibria 
                                                 
5 Note that it is not an equilibrium for both players to wait. This results in a payoff to HIGH of       
   and a 
profitable deviation for HIGH is to choose        0  which yields      
   >      
  . 
6 This point was previously noted by Romano and Yildirim (2001). 
  7above are eliminated since for LOW any strategy            ∈  0,      is weakly dominated 
by         .
7 The third equilibrium has LOW play her weakly dominant strategy,         , 
while HIGH chooses                0 . HIGH’s strategy is not weakly dominated: it is a strict 
best response to         . Thus the third equilibrium survives the refinement. 
In summary, theoretical analysis suggests that different forms of commitment opportunity 
will lead to different endogenous move orderings. Subgame perfection predicts that the 
detrimental move ordering will not emerge from the extended game with observable delay, while 
it can emerge from the extended game with action commitment. Restricting attention to 
equilibria in undominated strategies yields sharper predictions. The extended game with 
observable delay results in a simultaneous move game in the first period, with LOW contributing 
zero and HIGH making her stand-alone contribution. The extended game with action 
commitment results in the detrimental mover ordering: HIGH commits to contributing zero while 
LOW waits, and in the second period LOW makes her stand-alone contribution. 
2.3 Inequality averse players 
The preceding analysis is based on the assumption that players maximize own-payoffs. 
However, Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund (2002) and Gächter et al. (2010) find that subjects 
are willing to deviate from own-payoff maximizing responses in order to punish low contributors, 
and earnings are more equitable than predicted. These, and numerous other findings from 
laboratory experiments, are consistent with models in which players are concerned about payoff 
inequalities as well as own payoff. In this sub-section we examine how inequality aversion affects 
these theoretical results. 
We restrict ourselves to an analysis of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) specification of inequality 
aversion, where agen ’ t i s utility is given by 
                          ,0                ,0  
                                                 
7 To see this, first note that if HIGH waits LOW can attain     
   by also waiting, or by immediately contributing 
nothing; any other strategy results in a lower payoff. Next, if HIGH commits to contributing nothing LOW can 
attain     
    by waiting (and then contributing        in period 2), or by contributing       immediately; any 
other strategy yields a lower payoff. Finally, if HIGH commits to any other contribution in period 1 LOW 
maximizes her payoff by waiting (and then best responding in period 2), or by best responding immediately; 
any other strategy results in a lower payoff.  
  8with α ≥ β and 1 > β ≥ 0. We assume both agents have the same inequality aversion parameters, 
and this is common knowledge. We also restrict attention to the case where fHIGH = k fLOW with 
1   1 1 /   LOW
′  0 .
8  
In Figure 2 the best responses for the case α = β = 0 are shown as downward sloping 
dotted lines, and the locus of points where payoffs are equalized is shown as an upward sloping 
dotted line.
9 Inequality aversion alters the best response functions as shown in the Figure: 
players contribute less than their selfish best response when they are behind and more than their 
selfish best response when they are ahead.
10 For mild degrees of inequality aversion the best 
response functions intersect at a single point S′ where LOW contributes nothing and HIGH 
supplies the public good on her own, as shown in Figure 2.
11 The equilibrium outcome of the 
simultaneous move game is at S′. 
Figure 2. Mildly Inequality Averse Best Response Functions 
 








             
                                                 
8 This is the case for t ed as the basis for subjects’ earnings in the experiment. We describe the 
experimental earning n 3.  
he function us
s functions in Sectio
9 The restriction that   1 1 /   LOW
′  0  ensures that earning  is  sloping.    the equal- s locus  upward
10 Figure 2 shows the best responses of players with     0 . When   0  or   0  the corresponding part of a 
player’s best response coincides with his or her material best response. 
  9
11 By “mild inequality aversion” we thus mean a degree of inequality aversion whereby players’ best responses are 
perturbed but still intersect at a single point. When behind, HIGH’s best response brings total contributions up to G1, 
where       
′         1   / 1    /   . When ahead LOW’s best response brings total contributions up to G2, 
where      
′       1   / 1       , or   HIGH
′         1   / 1       . For the best response 
functions to intersect at a single point we must have G1 > G2, or       
′             
′     . Thus, for “mild inequality 
aversion” the parameters must satisfy the condition  1   / 1    /       1   / 1       . If the inequality aversion parameters are sufficiently close to   =   = 0 then LOW’s most 
preferred point on HIGH’s best response function is also at S′, while HIGH’s most preferred 
point on LOW’s best response function is at H′. In this case the implications for timing are the 
same as in the previous sub-section. Each extended game has a unique equilibrium in 
undominated strategies: in the OD game both players make contribution decisions in period 1, 
resulting in the outcome S′, while in the AC game LOW waits and HIGH commits to 
contributing nothing, resulting in outcome H′.   
However, depending on parameter values there is a rich set of potential outcomes. First, 
HIGH’s utility from committing to contributing nothing decreases as   increases (because 
LOW’s best response to zero decreases as   increases) and in fact HIGH’s incentive to commit 
may disappear entirely. For example, if   = 1/8 and   = 0, then for our experimental earnings 
functions the equilibrium outcome is at S′ for any move ordering. In this case any timing 
decisions constitute an equilibrium of the OD game. In the AC game, the only equilibrium in 
undominated strategies has both players wait and then coordinate on S′ in period 2. Thus 
inequality aversion introduces the theoretical possibility that both players delay contributions. 
Next consider the point L, at the top of the upward sloping part of HIGH’s best response 
function. It can be shown that HIGH prefers L to S′ for any parameter values. There are also 
parameter values where LOW prefers L to S′ (for example, for our experimental earnings 
function this is the case if   = 2/3 and   = 0). In this case the subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome of the game where LOW moves first is at L. In the AC game there is an equilibrium in 
undominated strategies where HIGH waits and LOW commits, resulting in point L, and similarly 
the sequential game in which LOW moves first, resulting in point L, emerges as an equilibrium 
in undominated strategies of the OD game. Thus, inequality aversion introduces the possibility 
that beneficial sequential move orderings emerge.  
The situation for moderate degrees of inequality aversion is shown in Figure 3.
12 The 
simultaneous move game has multiple equilibria and in order to analyze the extended game we 
                                                 
12 By “moderate inequality aversion” we simply mean that the best responses overlap, for which the formal condition 
is  1   / 1    /       1   / 1       , but that the highest point on the upward sloping part of LOW’s 
best response is below the highest point on the upward sloping part of HIGH’s best response, which requires   
1/2 . For our experimental earnings functions moderate inequality aversion implies that LOW’s best response to zero 
is zero as shown in the Figure. 
  10assume that players coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, denoted S′′. This is also 
HIGH’s most preferred point on LOW’s best response function, and thus the subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome of the game when HIGH moves first. There are two possibilities for the 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game where LOW moves first, denoted by the 
points L1 and L2. 
Figure 3. Moderately Inequality Averse Best Response Functions 








              
 
Suppose the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game where LOW moves first is at L1 (for 
example, this is the equilibrium for our experimental earnings functions when   = 1 and   = 0). 
In this case the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies of the OD game is for LOW to 
announce period 1 and HIGH to announce period 2, resulting in L1. Similarly the unique 
equilibrium of the AC game is for HIGH to wait and LOW to choose L1. Again, inequality 
aversion results in a beneficial sequential move game.  
The second possibility is that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game where LOW 
moves first is at L2 (for example, this is the equilibrium for our experimental earnings functions 
when   =   = 0.2). Then the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies of the OD game is for 
both players to announce period 1, resulting in S′′. On the other hand, in the unique equilibrium 
in undominated strategies of the AC game HIGH waits and LOW commits to L2. Thus the AC 
game results in a detrimental move ordering in which LOW commits. 
  11Finally, if players are ‘strongly inequality averse’ their best response functions are as 
shown in Figure 4 so that the upward sloping portion of LOW’s best response function 
encompasses the upward sloping portion of HIGH’s best response function.
13  
Figure 4. Strongly Inequality Averse Best Response Functions 
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In this case, when ahead, each player best responds by bringing total contributions up to a 
level beyond G
* as shown in the Figure.
14 The equilibrium outcome of all move orderings 
(assuming that the simultaneous move game results in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium) is the 
same, at S′′′. This results in equal earnings and the efficient level of public good provision. Any 
move ordering can result from the equilibrium of the extended OD game, while the unique 
equilibrium in undominated strategies for the AC game has both players to wait and then 
coordinate on S′′′ in period 2. 
Naturally, these results rely on the simplifying assumptions that the players have the same 
inequality aversion parameters, and that these are common knowledge. Yet the analysis of this 
simple case suffices to show that inequality aversion expands considerably the set of timing 
outcomes consistent with equilibrium. Interestingly, a general point that emerges is that 
                                                 
13 Strong requires     1/2  . 
  12
 inequality aversion requires 
14 As already noted in footnote 11, when ahead LOW’s best response brings total contributions up to    where 
  HIGH
′         1   / 1       . Note also that when ahead HIGH’s best response brings total contributions 
up to    where   HIGH
′       1   / 1       . Finally note that from the assumption that   HIGH      LOW and 
the definition of    it follows that   HIGH
′         /     1   . Using these expressions it can be shown that     1/2  
implies    <    <     and     1/2  implies    >    >   . detrimental sequential move orderings can be consistent with equilibrium in the AC game, but 
not the OD game.  
3. Experiment 
3.1 The basic game 
Our experiment is based on the discrete version of Varian’s game used in Gächter et al. 
(2010). There are two players, ‘HIGH’ and ‘LOW’.
 15 Each player is endowed with 17 tokens 
and decides how many to place in a Shared Account and how many to retain in a Private 
Account. We denote the number of tokens player i places in the Shared Account by gi ∈{0, …, 
17}. A player’s earnings from the game are the sum of her earnings from her Private Account 
and the Shared Account, where a player receives 50 points for each token in her Private Account 
and an additional amount of points for any token placed in the Shared Account. Thus placing a 
token in the Shared Account is akin to contributing to a public good. The earnings were derived 
from a quadratic pay f o f function: 
   5 · 1      ·  6 8·                       
 
     0 7      
where        1 . 3 2  and        0 . 8 9 . Earnings were presented to subjects in the form of 
earnings tables (see Appendix B) which rounded earnings to a multiple of 5 points.  
Predictions about total contributions and the distribution of contributions depend on the 
move order. In particular, under the assumption that players maximize own earnings, if HIGH 
and LOW make simultaneous contributions to the public good, or if LOW moves first, the 
equilibrium involves HIGH contributing 15 tokens and LOW contributing 0 tokens. However, if 
HIGH moves first, HIGH is predicted to contribute 0 tokens and LOW to contribute 6 tokens. 
Thus, under standard assumptions, when HIGH moves first a detrimental outcome results. 
3.2 The experimental treatments 
We study endogenous timing in this game using two different experimental treatments. In 
both treatments subjects know that they can make contributions in one out of two periods: they 
can either choose to commit to an early contribution, by contributing in period 1, or they can 
choose to contribute late in period 2.  
                                                 
15 During the experiment we used the labels ‘RED’ and ‘BLUE’ rather than ‘HIGH’ and ‘LOW’ when referring to 
the two types of player. See the experimental instructions, reproduced in Appendix A, for further details. 
  13Our OD treatment uses Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) extended game with observable 
delay. Prior to making contribution decisions, subjects simultaneously decide whether to 
contribute in period 1 or in period 2. After both subjects have committed to a contribution period, 
a computer screen announces the resulting move ordering, and subjects then make their 
contributions accordingly. In our AC treatment we use Hamilton and Slutsky's extended game 
with action commitment. In period 1 subjects can either choose to make a contribution decision 
immediately by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account, or they can choose 
to wait until period 2. In period 2 each subject is informed of any decisions made in period 1 and 
then, if the subject chose to wait in period 1, he or she must also make a contribution decision. 
Note that in both treatments four possible move orderings can occur: if both subjects 
make a contribution decision in the same period, then a simultaneous move ordering emerges, 
either in period 1 (SIM-1), or in period 2 (SIM-2). If subjects make contribution decisions in 
different periods, then a sequential move ordering emerges where either LOW moves first 
(LOW-FIRST), or HIGH moves first (HIGH-FIRST). Under the standard assumption that 
subjects maximize own earnings the equilibria in undominated strategies of the extended games 
result in SIM-1 (OD treatment) or HIGH-FIRST (AC treatment). However, as we have seen in 
the previous section, these results are sensitive to concerns for inequality.  
3.3 Experimental procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using subjects recruited 
from a university-wide pool of students who had previously indicated their willingness to be paid 
volunteers in decision-making experiments.
16 Four sessions (two sessions for each treatment) 
were initially conducted in spring 2009 using 16 participants per session. The experiment was 
repeated in spring 2010 (again two sessions per treatment with 16 participants per session). 
Overall, the average age of participants in the eight sessions was 20.6 years and 48% were male. No 
subject took part in more than one session and so 128 subjects participated in total.  
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and 
randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals. Subjects were then given a written set 
of instructions that the experimenter read aloud. The instructions included a set of control 
                                                 
16 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
  14questions about how choices translated into earnings. Subjects had to answer all the questions 
correctly before the experiment could continue. 
The decision-making phase of the session consisted of 15 rounds of one of the extended 
games described above, where in each round subjects were randomly matched with another 
participant. Neither during nor after the experiment were subjects informed about the identity of 
the other people in the room they were matched with. The matching procedure worked as 
follows. At the beginning of each session the participants were randomly allocated to one of two 
eight-person matching groups. The computer then randomly allocated the role of HIGH to four 
subjects and the role of LOW to the other four subjects in each matching group. Subjects were 
informed of their role at the beginning of the first round and kept this role throughout the 15 
rounds. At the beginning of each round the computer randomly formed pairs consisting of one 
HIGH and one LOW participant within each matching group. To ensure comparability among 
sessions and treatments, we randomly formed pairings within each matching group prior to the 
first session and used the same pairings for all sessions.
17 Because no information passed across 
the two matching groups, we treat data from each matching group as independent. Thus our 
design generates two independent observations for each session, or four independent 
observations per treatment. Repetition of the task was used because we expected that subjects 
might learn from experience. However, our desire to examine a one-shot game led us to use the 
random re-matching design in order to reduce repeated game effects. 
Subjects were paid based on their choices in one randomly-determined round. At the end of 
round fifteen a poker chip was drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The 
number on the chip determined the round that was used for determining all participants’ cash 
earnings. At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire 
asking for basic demographic and attitudinal information, including a self-assessment of their 
own risk attitudes.
18 Subjects were then privately paid according to their point earnings in the 
round which had been randomly selected at the end of round fifteen. Point earnings were 
                                                 
17 Subjects were informed that they would be randomly matched with another person in the room in each round (see 
Appendix A), although the details of the matching procedure were not specified. 
18 Subjects’ assessment of their own risk preferences was elicited asking the question suggested by Dohmen et al. 
(forthcoming). The question reads: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 
10 means: ‘fully prepared to take risk’ ”. The average response was 6.05 with a standard deviation of 1.89. 
  15converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.01 per point. Subject earnings ranged from £8.50 to 
£18.10, averaging £12.85, and sessions lasted about 74 minutes on average.  
3.4 Results  
In the following analysis of data we pool the experimental data collected in spring 2009 
and spring 2010: before pooling the data we checked for differences in timing and contribution 
behavior across the two blocks of sessions and found none.  
3.4.1 Timing behavior in the AC and OD treatments 
Table 1 reports the proportions of period 1 choices in the AC and OD treatments. These 
proportions are based on 1920 timing decisions, evenly divided among treatment and type of 
player. The relative frequency of period 1 contributions is higher in AC (29%) than in OD 
(22%), but the difference is statistically insignificant (p = 0.237).
19 This result holds for both 
HIGH and LOW subjects: the relative frequency of period 1 contributions is somewhat higher in 
AC than in OD for both types. The treatment effect is marginally significant for LOW (p = 
0.088), but not significant for HIGH (p = 0.677).  
Table 1. Proportions of Period 1 Contributions 
 AC  OD 
 round    Round   
  1 to 8  9 to 15  Overall  1 to 8  9 to 15  Overall 
HIGH .33  .20 .27  .33  .14 .24 
LOW .32  .31  .31  .22  .16  .19 
overall .32 .25 .29 .27 .15  .22 
Overall in both treatments of our experiment the majority of subjects prefer to wait until 
period 2 to make a contribution decision. Moreover, there is no trend towards more frequent 
period 1 choices in later rounds: in both treatments and for both HIGH and LOW the proportions 
of period 1 choices decrease from the first to the second half of the experiment.
 20 
                                                 
19 Unless otherwise noted p-values are based on two-sided randomization tests, taking as the unit of observation the 
independent matching group, and computed using the STATA command tsrtest. Moir (1998) describes the 
randomization test and discusses its advantages.  
20 This contrasts with Poulsen and Roos (2010) who find an increasing tendency to commit, as predicted by standard 
theory, in a bargaining game with endogenous timing and observable delay.  
  16Regression analysis of timing decisions confirms that the treatment and type of player have 
little explanatory power for the observed frequency of period 1 contributions. Table 2 reports the 
coefficients and marginal effects from a probit model where the explanatory variables are a 
treatment dummy (AC = 1, OD = 0), a dummy for type of player (LOW = 1, HIGH = 0), an 
interaction term between the treatment dummy and the type of player dummy, and controls for 
time effects and individual characteristics.
21 
Table 2. Regression Analysis of the Probability of Contributing in Period 1 
  Coefficient marginal  effect 
Treatment (1 if AC)  .066 
(.235)  .021 
Type (1 if LOW)  -.164 
(.101)  -.051 
Treatment * Type  .343
* 
(.203)  .104 
Gender (1 if Female)  -.423
*** 
(.114)  -.132 
Willingness to Take Risks  .052
*** 
(.018)  .016 
Round   -.045
*** 









Probit regression. Dependent variable equals 1 if subject made a contribution in period 1 and 0 
otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis adjusted for intragroup correlation (matching-
groups are used as independent clustering units). *  10 . 05 . ≤ ≤ p ; **  05 . 01 . < ≤ p ; ***  .  01 . < p
Holding all other variables constant, the probability of HIGH contributing in period 1 is 
higher in the AC treatment than in the OD treatment, but the effect is statistically insignificant. 
For LOW subjects the effect is instead significant at the 10% level (Wald test:    1   
2.90,    0.089 . These findings are consistent with the non-parametric results reported earlier. 
LOW subjects seem to be somewhat less likely to contribute in period 1 in the OD treatment than 
HIGH subjects, but the effect is statistically insignificant, and is reversed for the AC treatment. 
The regression also confirms that the likelihood of committing to a contribution level in period 1 
decreases over time: the coefficient of the variable Round is negative and highly significant. 
                                                 
21 The marginal effects are calculated holding all variables at their means. The marginal effects for the dummy 
variables are for discrete changes of the variable from 0 to 1. The marginal effect for the interaction term has been 
computed using the Stata command inteff (see Norton et al., 2004. Also see Ai and Norton, 2003).  
  17Subjects’ timing behavior is better explained by their personal characteristics: for example, 
female participants are significantly less likely (about 13%) to make a contribution decision in 
period 1 than male subjects. This result is consistent with the findings by Arbak and Villeval 
(2007), who find that female participants are significantly less likely to make a leadership 
contribution than male participants in a related experiment on endogenous leadership in a linear 
voluntary contributions game. As committing to a contribution in period 1 may be seen as a risky 
decision (e.g. because there is a chance that period 2-movers deviate from their best-response 
contribution to punish low period 1 contributions), we may expect that higher sensitivity to risks 
may also induce subjects to delay their contribution decision until period 2. Indeed, we find that 
subjects who self-report a lower willingness to take risks are significantly less likely to 
contribute in period 1. 
 
Next we examine the frequency with which different move orderings emerge. Since 
observed move orderings in our experiment reflect subject decisions and the matching scheme 
imposed by the experimenter, we remove the impact of the particular matching scheme used by 
computing expected relative frequencies of different move orderings given subjects’ timing 
decisions. For each matching-group we compute the expected relative frequency of a given move 
ordering       ,       ,      ,   1; ent as:        2 , in a given round of the experim
          ,          
      ·     
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where       is the number of HIGH players (out of four) within the matching group that choose 
to contribute in period       and      is the number of LOW players (out of four) within the 
matching group that choose to contribute in period     . For example, to compute the 
probability of observing the detrimental move ordering HIGH-FIRST, i.e.         1 ,         
2 , in a given matching group in a given round of the experiment we count the number of HIGH 
and LOW players within the matching group who in that round choose to move in period 1 and 2 
respectively and apply the formula above.  
Table 3 and Figure 5 show, separately for each treatment, how the probability of a move 
ordering evolves across the 15 rounds of the experiment. Averaging across rounds and matching-
groups, the move ordering that is most likely to emerge in our experiment is by far SIM-2: its 
probability is 63% in OD and 50% in AC. Moreover, in both treatments the probability of 
observing both players contributing simultaneously in period 2 increases in the second half of the 
  18experiment (by about 20 percentage points in OD and by 8 percentage points in AC). The 
probability of observing a sequential move ordering is low in both treatments: in particular, the 
probability of HIGH-FIRST, that is predicted to lead to lower public good provision under 
standard assumptions, is less than 20% and decreases over time both in OD and AC.  
Table 3. Probability of Alternative Move Orderings * 
 
AC OD 
 round  round 
move ordering  Overall  1 to 8  9 to 15  overall  1 to 8  9 to 15 
















































* The table shows the expected relative frequency of a move ordering based on individual 
timing decisions, averaged across rounds and matching-groups, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Standard deviations are computed using matching-group-level averages across 
the 15 rounds as observation units. 


























































































































































  19In summary, our experiment shows that both LOW and HIGH subjects have a strong 
tendency to wait to make a contribution decision until period 2. This tendency is common to both 
treatments and increases over time. As a result, sequential move orderings are rarely observed in 
the experiment, and by far the most likely move ordering is SIM-2, where both players delay.  
3.4.2 Contribution behavior in the AC and OD treatments 
Figure 6 shows how the average contribution per pair, pooling across different move 
orderings, develops over the experiment. In both treatments contributions decrease initially, and 
then stabilize at a lower level. Contributions per pair across all rounds average 13.8 tokens in OD 
and 15.1 tokens in AC (p = 0.290).  
Figure 6. Aggregate Contributions across Rounds 
  
The distribution of contributions across HIGH and LOW subjects is also very similar in the 
two treatments as shown in Figure 7. HIGH subjects contribute more than LOW subjects: HIGH 
subjects contribute on average 10.3 tokens in OD and 10.7 tokens in AC (p = 0.668), and LOW 
subjects’ contributions across the whole 15 rounds average 3.5 in OD and 4.3 in AC (p = 0.345). 
Figure 7. HIGH and LOW Contributions across Rounds 
 
  20Table 4 shows how aggregate contributions break out across the four possible move 
orderings of our extended games. In the most common move ordering, SIM-2, the subgames 
played in the OD and AC treatments are comparable: both subjects know that they are 
contributing simultaneously in period 2. The outcomes are similar across the two treatments, 
with pairs contributing on average 14.9 tokens in AC and 13.4 tokens in OD. In OD aggregate 
contributions are lowest in HIGH-FIRST: this result is in line with Varian’s model predictions 
and with previous findings from Gächter et al (2010), who also found that public good provision 
was lowest in the sequential game where the player with the highest valuation of the public good 
moves first. In AC although aggregate contributions averaged across all rounds are lowest in the 
other sequential game, LOW-FIRST, in the second half of the experiment contributions are 
lowest in HIGH-FIRST.  
Table 4. Aggregate Contributions per Treatment and Move Ordering
* 
     Round 
Treatment  Move Ordering  Overall  1 to 8  9 to 15 
AC 
SIM-1  19.7 
(9.32) (n =45) 
21.9 
(7.90)( n =35) 
12.1 
(10.28) (n =10) 
SIM-2  14.9 
(6.17) (n =245) 
15.3 
(6.73)( n =125) 
14.4 
(5.51) (n =120) 
HIGH-FIRST  14.5 
(7.44) (n =84) 
16.3 
(7.57)( n =49) 
12.0 
(6.53) (n =35) 
LOW-FIRST  14.0 
(6.68) (n =106) 
15.5 
(7.80)( n =47) 
12.8 
(5.41) (n =59) 
OD 
SIM-1  14.8 
(5.95) (n =33) 
16.6 
(5.83) (n =21) 
11.7 
(4.97) ( n =12) 
SIM-2  13.4 
(6.19) (n =305) 
14.1 
(6.58)( n =136) 
12.8 
(5.81) (n =169) 
HIGH-FIRST  13.0 
(6.24) (n =83) 
13.9 
(6.32)( n =64) 
10.0 
(5.00) (n =19) 
LOW-FIRST  16.5 
 (6.05) (n =59) 
16.5 
(6.41)( n =35) 
16.4 
(5.61) (n =24) 
* The table shows aggregate contributions per game, with standard deviations and underlying number 
of games in parentheses. Standard deviations are computed using games as observation units. 
Table 5 shows how contributions vary by type of player as well as by treatment and move 
ordering. In most of the cases HIGH contributes on average between 9 and 12 tokens, and LOW 
  21between 4 and 8 tokens. In HIGH-FIRST, where according to standard theory HIGH should 
commit to free ride and let LOW contribute 6 tokens, HIGH (LOW) contributions are clearly 
higher (lower) than the predicted level. In fact, HIGH contribution behavior does not seem to 
differ much across the different move orderings and LOW contributions in HIGH-FIRST are 
actually lower than in alternative move orderings. As a result, the distribution of contributions is 
more even than is predicted under the standard assumption that players maximize own material 
payoffs. 
Table 5. Individual Contributions by Type of Player
* 
Treatment Move  ordering  HIGH  LOW 
AC 

































*The table shows contribution per game, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Standard deviations are computed using games as observation units. 
It is interesting to compare these contributions with those observed in Gächter et al. (2010), 
who run an experimental test of the Varian’s (1994) model under exogenously imposed move 
structures using the same parameterization that we used for the current experiment.
 The cleanest 
comparison is with our OD treatment, because in this treatment subjects always know the move 
ordering when they make their contributions. Table 6 compares contributions from the exogenous 
and endogenous move orderings (for the purposes of this comparison we pool the data from SIM-1 
and SIM-2 move orderings).  
  22Table 6. Contributions under Endogenous and Exogenous Move Orderings
* 
    AGGREGATE HIGH  LOW 
SIM 






































*The table shows aggregate and individual contributions per game, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Standard deviations are computed using games as observation units. The exogenous move orderings data are from 
the FMA treatments of Gächter et al. (2010). The endogenous move orderings data are from our OD treatment, 
pooling the data from SIM-1 and SIM-2 move orderings. 
One reason contributions may differ in the endogenously determined move orderings is that 
subjects may behave more cooperatively in settings where they can influence the way they interact 
with each other, compared to settings where the structure of the interactions is imposed 
exogenously, as suggested by recent studies (e.g., Dal Bó et al., forthcoming; Sutter et al., 
forthcoming). However, we find little evidence for this in our data. Although we observe higher 
contribution levels when subgames with sequential move orderings are reached endogenously rather 
than exogenously, none of these differences are significant at conventional levels (all p-values > 
0.145). For the simultaneous move ordering, contributions in the exogenous games exceed those in 
the endogenous games, though the difference is again insignificant (all p-values > 0.575).
22 
Another interesting similarity between our study and Gächter et al. (2010) is that in both 
studies the distribution of contributions across type of player is more even than predicted by 
standard theory, irrespective of move ordering. Gächter et al. (2010) find that this compression of 
contributions in sequential games can be explained by a tendency of second-movers to punish first-
movers for excessively low contributions by systematically contributing less than their material 
best-response. Although we have too few observations on second-mover behavior to conduct the 
same analysis as Gächter et al. (2010), our data suggest a similar phenomenon in our 
endogenously determined sequential subgames. For example pooling data from our two treatments, 
                                                 
22 For these comparisons we apply randomization tests to 8 independent observations from our OD treatment and 4 
independent observations from the Gächter et al. (2010) data. 
  23we note that when HIGH contributes 0 as a first-mover LOW contributes 3.62 tokens on average 
(n=16), compared with a material best response of 6 tokens, and when LOW contributes 0 as a 
first-mover HIGH contributes 10.79 tokens on average (n=58), compared with a material best 
response of 15 tokens. Note that by contributing one less token than the material best response the 
punisher incurs a small cost (her earnings are reduced by 5 points) relative to the cost incurred by 
the punishee (e.g. HIGH’s earnings in HIGH-FIRST are reduced by 75 points if LOW contributes 
5 rather than 6 tokens). This is because the punisher’s earnings function is relatively flat in the 
neighborhood of her material best response, whereas the punishee’s earnings function is strictly 
increasing in the punisher’s contribution.  
3.4.3 Explaining timing behavior 
Given that committing to low contributions in period 1 induces punishment by second-
movers, one possible reason why subjects in our experiment refrain from making early 
contributions may be that this is less profitable than contributing in period 2.
23 Table 7 examines 
this possibility by showing the average payoff that subjects earned by contributing in period 1 
and in period 2, conditional on the period choice of their opponent.  
Table 7 suggests that, for AC, LOW is better off waiting than committing to a 
contribution in period 1, irrespective of HIGH’s timing decision. Given this HIGH does better by 
waiting also. Overall, averaging across opponents’ timing decisions, both type of player are 
better off waiting than committing. However, it is complicated to draw a parallel between the 
empirical payoffs shown in Table 7 and the theoretical payoffs in the AC game since the 
empirical payoffs are averaged over a variety of contribution decisions. In fact, for both types of 
player there are some contribution levels in period 1 that yield a higher payoff than waiting. For 
the OD treatment, it is even less clear that waiting is a profitable strategy. Overall HIGH is better 
off choosing period 1, and given this LOW is better off choosing period 1 as well. 
                                                 
23 Note, however, that in linear public goods game experiments leaders typically end up earning less than followers 
(e.g., Gächter and Renner, 2003; Güth et al., 2007), but nevertheless Arbak and Villeval (2007) and Rivas and Sutter 
(2009) find that a significant proportion of subjects volunteer to lead. While the existence of followers who 
contribute more if leaders contribute can explain why strategic leaders may have an incentive to make positive 
contributions once they are appointed (e.g., Cartwright and Patel, 2010), it remains an open question why a strategist 
would volunteer to lead given that it is not profitable to do so. Arbak and Villeval (2007) suggest voluntary leaders 
may be motivated by social concerns.  









    g in tHIGH=1  WAIT  g in tLOW=1  WAIT 
Opponent 
chooses: 
g in tj=1 1409 1303  1219 1329 
WAIT  1239 1298 1269  1318
  Total  1298 1299 1254  1320 








    tHIGH=1  tHIGH=2  tLOW=1  tLOW=2 
Opponent 
chooses: 
tj=1 1322 1377  1301 1293 
tj=2 1251  1247 1291 1313
  Total  1271 1268 1295  1309 
* The table shows subjects’ average point earnings conditional on their timing choice and their opponent’s choice.  
As discussed in Section 2, inequality aversion provides another reason why subjects 
might delay, and as already noted, there are patterns in contribution behavior that are consistent 
with concerns for earnings equality. The theoretical analysis in Section 2 shows that the 
frequently observed SIM-2 move order can emerge when players are inequality averse, but only 
in two cases. One of these occurs when players are mildly inequality averse and equilibrium 
contributions do not depend on move structure. In this case, in the equilibria of the AC and OD 
games in which both players delay, LOW contributes nothing. However, of the 550 games with 
the SIM-2 move structure observed in the experiment, in only 199 (36%) did LOW free ride. The 
second case occurs when players are strongly inequality averse. In this case, in the equilibria of 
the AC and OD games where both players delay, the players provide the socially efficient level 
of the public good. However, socially efficient provision is attained in only 27 out of 550 games 
(5%) with the SIM-2 move structure. Thus the vast majority of SIM-2 games feature 
contributions that are inconsistent with the simple model of inequality aversion.  
Finally, as  noted by Fonseca, Müller, and Normann (2006) an alternative reason for 
delaying decisions in a strategic context is that by doing so individuals may be able to resolve the 
  25strategic uncertainty about the opponent’s action, giving them an opportunity to observe and 
hence respond to their period 1 contribution decisions. Free-form comments left by subjects in 
the post-experimental questionnaire about the motivations underlying their choices in the course 
of the experiment lend some support to this interpretation.
24 We also notice that the contribution 
behavior observed in our experiment leaves little room for a subject to exploit other subjects who 
delay. The rare attempts by subjects with high valuations to jump in and contribute zero in the 
first period usually backfire, as opponents tend to react by contributing less than their best 
response. Thus, the waiting strategy is sustained by the willingness of subjects to punish others 
who attempt to exploit them. Interestingly, it takes only a small willingness to punish to 
eliminate exploitation. 
4. Conclusions 
In an important theoretical contribution to the literature on the voluntary provision of 
public goods Varian (1994, p. 165) shows that “the ability to commit to a contribution 
exacerbates the free-rider problem”: a first mover exploits a first-mover advantage by 
committing to an early, low contribution, relying on other late contributors to provide the public 
good on their own. If an agent with a high value of the public good commits to free riding overall 
provision of the public good is lower. 
Previous theoretical studies have raised questions about the applicability of this result. 
Vesterlund (2003) and Romano and Yildirim (2005) point out that Varian’s (1994) result relies 
crucially on the assumption that agents can commit to contribute exactly once. They show that 
when multiple contributions are feasible leaders are unable to commit to not increasing their 
contributions later, and allowing agents to contribute sequentially does not undermine public 
good provision. Our paper raises a different question: we explicitly allow commitment and 
examine whether the ability to commit exacerbates free-riding.  
In our experiment, and in line with the results reported in Gächter et al. (2010), we do 
find that aggregate contributions are generally lower in the detrimental move ordering where the 
agent with the highest value of the public good moves first. However, we also find that subjects 
                                                 
24 Examples of comments made by subjects about their timing decisions are: “People don’t like to take risks. Rather 
play it safe and with full knowledge”. Another person explained that (s)he had chosen to move second most of the 
time in order to “ observe what people have done”. Someone explained that (s)he “always went in stage 2 so there 
was a chance to see other player’s decision”. 
  26usually avoid committing to an early contribution. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) we 
embody commitment opportunities within extended games with observable delay and with action 
commitment. In the extended game with observable delay the detrimental move ordering should 
not, theoretically, arise, nor is it often observed in the experiment. In the extended game with 
action commitment the detrimental move ordering is predicted under standard theoretical 
assumptions, but in our data it is rarely observed. In our experiment, by far the most common 
outcome is for both players delay and contribute in the last period.  
Our results are reminiscent of the findings from the theoretical and experimental literature 
that uses Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) extended games to study endogenous timing in duopoly 
games. In the extended duopoly game with action commitment, under appropriate assumptions, a 
sequential move ordering is predicted to emerge where a firm leads by producing in the first 
period and the other follows and produces in the second period after having observed the leader’s 
quantity choice. However, observed behavior in controlled laboratory experiments systematically 
contradicts this theoretical result (Huck, Müller, and Normann, 2002; Fonseca, Huck, and 
Normann, 2005). The predicted Stackelberg leader-follower outcomes are rarely observed, both 
because simultaneous play occurs more frequently than sequential play, and because the chosen 
quantities in the duopoly games are typically more in line with Cournot than with Stackelberg 
levels. Moreover, a notable tendency to delay production decisions until the second period is 
often observed. Indeed, firms appear reluctant to commit to early production even in an extended 
game with observable delay which has a unique, symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium where 
both firms produce in the first period (Fonseca, Müller, and Normann, 2006).
 25 
Overall, our results suggest that the existence of commitment opportunities may not 
necessarily result in an exacerbation of the free-rider problem. While in theory there exists a 
sequential move ordering where aggregate contributions and joint earnings are lower than in a 
simultaneous move orderings, this detrimental move ordering rarely emerges when agents can 
choose the timing of their contributions. 
                                                 
25 Datta Mago and Dechenaux (2009) study price leadership in an endogenous game with observable delay and 
asymmetric firms where the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has one firm setting the price in period 1 and the 
other firm setting the price in period 2. In their experiment they find strong tendency to wait from both firms, 
although equilibrium predictions find more support in the data when firm size asymmetry is high.  
  27Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
Instructions 
General 
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision making. You will be 
paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount you earn will depend on your 
decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully. It is important that you do not talk to any of the 
other participants until the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a 
monitor will come to your desk to answer it. 
The experiment will consist of fifteen rounds. There are sixteen participants in this room. Before the first 
round begins the computer will randomly assign the role of “RED” to eight participants and the role of 
“BLUE” to eight participants. You will be informed of your role, either RED or BLUE, at the beginning 
of round one and you will keep this role throughout the fifteen rounds. In each round the computer will 
randomly form eight pairs consisting of one RED and one BLUE participant. Thus, you will be randomly 
matched with another person in this room in each round, but this may be a different person from round to 
round. You will not learn who is matched with you in any round, neither during nor after today’s session.  
Each round is identical. In each round you and the person you are matched with will make choices and 
earn points. The point earnings will depend on the choices as we will explain below. At the end of the 
experiment one of the fifteen rounds will be selected at random. Your earnings from the experiment will 
depend on your point earnings in this randomly selected round. These point earnings will be converted 
into cash at a rate of 1p per point. 
How You Earn Points 
At the beginning of the round you will be given an endowment of 17 tokens. You have to decide how 
many of these tokens to place in a Private Account and how many to place in a Shared Account.  
For each token you place in your Private Account you will earn 50 points, as shown in Table 1. 
For each token placed in the Shared Account you will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether 
the token was placed by you or the person you are matched with. Likewise, for each token placed in the 
Shared Account the person you are matched with will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether 
the token was placed by you or them. Earnings from the Shared Account are shown in Table 2. 
Your point earnings for the round will be the sum of your earnings from your Private Account and your 
earnings from the Shared Account. 
  28So that everyone understands how choices translate into point earnings we will give an example and a 
test. Please note that the allocations of tokens used for the example and test are simply for illustrative 
purposes. In the experiment the allocations will depend on the actual choices of the participants. 
Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the Shared Account, and 
BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in the Shared Account. In this example there 
are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 
1050 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his 
Private Account, plus 705 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1205 points. 
Test: Before we continue with the instructions we want to make sure that everyone understands how their 
earnings are determined. Please answer the questions below. Raise your hand if you have a question.  
After a few minutes a monitor will check your answers. When everyone has answered the questions 
correctly we will continue with the instructions. 
Suppose RED allocates 11 tokens to his Private Account and 6 tokens to the Shared Account, and 
BLUE allocates 5 tokens to his Private Account and 12 tokens to the Shared Account. 
1. What will be RED’s point earnings from his private account?      __________ 
2. What will be RED’s point earnings from the shared account?      __________ 
3. What will be RED’s point earnings for the round?         __________ 
4. What will be BLUE’s point earnings from his private account?     __________ 
5. What will be BLUE’s point earnings from the shared account?     __________ 
6. What will be BLUE’s point earnings  for  the  round?     __________ 
How You Make Decisions 
[AC treatment: 
In each round you must allocate your endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared 
Account. You can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then 
automatically place the remainder of your endowment in your Private Account.  Each round consists of 
two stages. In stage one you can either allocate your endowment immediately by typing in a number of 
tokens to place in the Shared Account, or wait until stage two to allocate your endowment. You do this by 
typing in the letter “W”, for “WAIT”.  
At the same time, the person with whom you are matched will be either allocating their endowment or 
deciding to wait. 
After you and the person you are matched with have both made stage one decisions the computer will 
show an information screen to both of you displaying whether each person made an allocation decision in 
stage one, or decided to wait until stage two. 
  29Four possible situations may occur: 
1) If both you and the other person made allocation decisions in stage one: in this situation no decisions 
are made in stage two and the round ends immediately.  
2) If both you and the other person decided to wait until stage two to make allocation decisions: both of 
you must make allocation decisions at the same time in stage two. You must type in a number of 
tokens to place in the Shared Account. At the same time, the other person will be deciding how many 
tokens to place in the Shared Account. 
3) If you made your allocation decision in stage one and the other person decided to wait until stage two: 
the other person must make an allocation decision in stage two. In stage two the computer will inform 
the other person of your allocation decision. After seeing how many tokens you allocated to the Shared 
Account, the other person will make an allocation decision by typing in a number of tokens to place in 
the Shared Account. 
4) If the other person made an allocation decision in stage one and you decided to wait until stage two: 
you must make your allocation decision in stage two. In stage two the computer will inform you of the 
other person’s allocation decision. After seeing how many tokens the other person allocated to the 
Shared Account, you will make your allocation decision by typing in a number of tokens to place in 
the Shared Account.] 
[OD treatment: 
In each round you must allocate your endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared 
Account. You can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then 
automatically place the remainder of your endowment in your Private Account.  Each round consists of 
two stages. At the beginning of the round you must decide whether to make your allocation decision in 
stage one or in stage two.  
At the same time, the person with whom you are matched will be deciding whether to make their 
allocation decision in stage one or in stage two. 
After you and the person you are matched with have both decided in which stage to make allocation 
decisions the computer will show an information screen to both of you displaying in which stage each 
person will make an allocation decision. 
Four possible situations may occur: 
1) If both you and the other person decided to make allocation decisions in stage one: both of you must 
make allocation decisions at the same time in stage one. You must type in a number of tokens to place 
  30in the Shared Account. At the same time, the other person will be deciding how many tokens to place 
in the Shared Account. In this situation no decisions are made in stage two. 
2) If both you and the other person decided to make allocation decisions in stage two: both of you must 
make allocation decisions at the same time in stage two. You must type in a number of tokens to place 
in the Shared Account. At the same time, the other person will be deciding how many tokens to place 
in the Shared Account. In this situation no decisions are made in stage one. 
3) If you decided to make your allocation decision in stage one and the other person decided to make an 
allocation decision in stage two: in stage one you must decide how many tokens to place in the Shared 
Account. In stage two the computer will inform the other person of your allocation decision. After 
seeing how many tokens you allocated to the Shared Account, the other person will make an allocation 
decision by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. 
4) If the other person decided to make an allocation decision in stage one and you decided to make your 
allocation decision in stage two: in stage one the other person must decide how many tokens to place 
in the Shared Account. In stage two the computer will inform you of the other person’s allocation 
decision. After seeing how many tokens the other person allocated to the Shared Account, you will 
make your allocation decision by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account.] 
At the end of stage two the computer will show an information screen to you and the person you are 
matched with. This screen will display the total number of tokens placed in the Shared Account and the 
earnings of each person for that round. After you have read the information screen, you must click on the 
continue button to go on to the next round.  
Notice that each round consists of TWO stages, but in each round you will make only ONE allocation 
decision. Once you have made an allocation decision it cannot be changed. However, you can choose 
whether to make your allocation decision in stage one or in stage two. 
How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined  
At the end of round fifteen there will be a random draw to select the round for which you will be paid. A 
poker chip will be drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The number on the chip 
will determine the round that is used for determining all participants’ cash earnings. Your point earnings 
in this randomly selected round will be converted into cash at a rate of 1p per point. You will be paid in 
private and in cash. 
Beginning the Experiment  
Now, please look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions. If you have a question at any 
time please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it.  
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Table 1. Earnings from Your Private Account            Table 2. Earnings from the Shared Account 
TOKENS IN YOUR 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT 
YOUR POINT EARNINGS 














          
0 0    0  0  0 
1 50    1  90  60 
2 100    2  180  120 
3 150    3  260  175 
4 200    4  340  230 
5 250    5  415  285 
6 300    6  490  340 
7 350    7  565  385 
8 400    8  635  430 
9 450    9  700  475 
10 500    10  765  520 
11 550    11  825  560 
12 600    12  885  600 
13 650    13  940  635 
14 700    14  995  670 
15  750   15 1050  705 
16  800   16 1095  740 
17  850   17 1140  770 
     18  1180  800 
     19  1220  830 
     20  1260  855 
     21  1295  880 
     22  1330  900 
     23  1360  920 
     24  1385  940 
     25  1410  960 
     26  1435  975 
     27  1455  990 
     28  1470  1000 
     29  1485  1010 
     30  1500  1020 
     31  1510  1025 
     32  1515  1030 
     33  1520  1035 
     34  1525  1040 References 
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